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Justice:  From Global 
Transformation to Local    
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 - Donna L. Chollett 
 
IN DEFENSE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: 
 FROM GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION TO LOCAL RESISTANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The global transformations that enveloped Latin America over the past decade resulted in uneven 
consequences for diverse social groups.  Scholars witness an increasing tension between a 
macro-economic agenda concerned with profitability and local community access to employment 
and sustenance.  As neoliberal reforms intensify Latin America's integration into the world 
economy, they may adversely impact local communities.  Should local people lose their ability to 
obtain basic rights, will they be able to effectively challenge the neoliberal model?  In the absence 
of more adequate attention to social justice, it is probable that occurrences of local resistance in 
defense of these rights will escalate. 
 From the perspective of policy makers, neoliberalism promised important advantages.  Debt-
ridden Latin American countries adopted IMF-mandated polices as a condition for debt 
restructuring.  In turn, they received access to new loans.  Neoliberal policies also promised to 
stimulate economic growth.  According to this logic, the privatization of inefficient parastatal 
industries would contribute to modernization and greater profitability.  As a result, an increase in 
export production would generate revenues for the benefit of the national economy. 
 From the perspective of those who live with the consequences of neoliberal policies, the 
benefits remain elusive.  Privatizations replaced state paternalism inherent in parastatal industries 
with a more profit-oriented managerial system.  Frequently this change involved large worker 
layoffs and reduction of credit to small-scale producers.  Simultaneously, global market integration 
placed local producers in competition with more economically competitive international actors.  As 
a result, many small-scale producers and workers suffered declining incomes. 
 Below, I analyze the impact of neoliberalism on the Mexican sugar sector.  Privatization of 
Mexican sugar mills from 1988-1992 and the inclusion of sugar trade into the 1994 NAFTA 
agreement dramatically transformed sugar production and marketing.  In the 1990s, food and 
beverage processors in Mexico began to replace cane sugar with lower-cost HFCS (high fructose 
corn syrup) in their products.  Competition with alternative sweeteners imported from the U.S. 
hindered the ability of Mexican refineries to market their sugar, leaving them with severe cash-flow 
problems that imperiled the industry.  Sugar industry officials predicted that HFCS will force 20 
sugar mills to close.  In addition, pressure by political interest groups to modify NAFTA in regard to 
trade in sugar and HFCS circumvented the "free hand of the market," placing sugar mills at 
greater risk. 
 Next, I present an in-depth community study of Puruarán, Michoacán, to examine the local 
consequences of these transformations.  In this case, the mill owner closed down the community's 
sugar mill, leaving residents unemployed.  While mill owners tend to view cane growers and 
workers as unproductive, local growers and workers at Puruarán mobilized in defiance of police 
repression to defend their right to employment. 
 The research is based on fieldwork, from 1997 to 2001, that addressed several research 
questions:  Did privatization of sugar mills contribute to productive efficiency and increased 
earnings?  By 1997, some growers, who earlier experienced debts, succeeded in earning small 
profits.  Was this experience universal?  While some mills showed economic recovery, corporate 
consolidation (the concentration of production into fewer mills) and market opening under NAFTA 
contributed to the closure of the Puruarán mill. 
 Six of Mexico's 60 sugar mills closed their doors between 1986 and 1997.  Thus, Ingenio (sugar 
mill) Puruarán with its community of 11,373 inhabitants is not representative.  The importance of 
this case lies in the absence of research that examines the impact of agroindustrial shutdowns on 
rural communities.  Puruarán is unique because it is the only community where a social 
movement emerged to contest the mill closing.  What makes this community significant is the 
potential closure of 20 more Mexican sugar mills as HFCS imports under NAFTA displace cane 
sugar.  Events that jeopardized social justice in Puruarán stand to be replicated. 
 The research involved formal and informal interviews with a non-random sample of cane 
growers, ex-mill workers, and community leaders, to ascertain the impact of mill closure on the 
community.  These data reveal changes in economic strategies, household income, attitudes 
about the mill closure, and involvement in efforts to reopen the mill.  Sugar industry offices in 
Mexico City provided additional data to situate Puruarán within the national context. 
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
Mexico's 1980s debt crisis served as a catalyst for neoliberal reforms aimed at economic 
restructuring.  IMF's solution for debt restructuring and economic recovery called for 
privatization of industries and dismantling of barriers to international trade.  Privatization 
became the anecdote for government mismanagement of Mexico's parastatals.  While 
privatization freed up government resources, market integration contributed to foreign exchange 
earnings.  The privatization of state-owned sugar mills from 1988 to 1992 and the enactment of 
NAFTA in 1994 brought profound consequences for Mexican sugarcane growers and mill 
workers. 
 Privatization resulted in the consolidation of 50 sugar mills into 11 consortiums. These 
consortiums maintained linkages to a variety of enterprisesi and established easy access to sugar 
for their sugar-based products.  Twenty-five mills, for example, held soft drink franchises with 
Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Mexican soft drinks. 
 Initially, a severe crisis besieged the sugar sector:  new owners failed to invest in modernizing 
their mills, market opening flooded the country with imported sugar,ii mechanical failures left 
unprocessed cane rotting in the fields, and cane growers experienced large debts to mill owners 
(Chollett 1995).  Buyouts of one consortium by another, and the splitting of certain consortiums 
reflected the volatility of the sugar sector.  By 1994, however, the sugar sector showed signs of 
recovery.  As new investments rejuvenated the industry, Mexico regained its sugar export 
capacity and cane growing became somewhat profitable.  In 1997, acreage, yields, and factory 
efficiency all showed significant increases.iii 
   Despite record production, by 2000, industrialists accumulated debts of two billion dollars.  
Inability to pay off loans provoked the failure of FINASA, the government financial institution for 
the sugar sector.  The cane harvest of 2000-2001 ended in May, yet industrialists were unable 
to pay growers for their cane.  During July and August, 2001 cane growers marched on Mexico 
City and seized government buildings, including the Secretariat of Agriculture, in demand of 
back payments in the amount of $500,000,000  dollars.  Grupo Santos, owner of the Puruarán 
sugar mill, owed a debt of $200,000,000.  President Vicente Fox, in response, expropriated 27 
of Mexico’s 59 sugar mills in September, with the intent of consolidating and reselling them.  
Among the expropriated mills are those belonging to Grupos Santos, GAM, CAZE, and 
Machado.   Many of these may face the same fate as Ingenio Puruarán.  
   The impressive national-level achievements cited above were not uniform.  Private mill owners 
increased profitability of their mills by favoring more efficient cane growers.  They denied credit to 
less efficient growers, often forcing them out of cane production.  In some cases, mill managers 
assumed direct control of the land until the cañeros' debts were paid off.  In other cases, they 
denied entry of low-yielding cane for processing.  These policies marginalized producers with 
fewer resources and created substantial hardships for family survival. 
 Similarly, mill owners concentrated their interests in fewer mills by favoring their more 
productive refineries and excluding their less efficient mills.  Six sugar refineries closed following 
privatization:  Ingenio Oacalco, Morelos (1988); Ingenio Estipac, Jalisco (1988); Ingenio José 
López Mateos Juchitán, Oaxaca (1992); Ingenio Purísima, Jalisco (1992); Ingenio Puruarán, 
Michoacán (1992); and Ingenio Rosales, Sinaloa (1997).   
 Grupo Azucarero Mexico, affiliated with Pepsico, exemplifies this process.  Its owners bought 
out Grupo Sucrum, formerly owned by Alberto Santos de Hoyos.  Santos purchased four mills in 
1991, forming Grupo Santos.  This entrepreneur sealed the fate of the Puruarán mill in 1992, 
when he claimed the mill unprofitable, closed it, and consolidated his interests in the three 
remaining Santos refineries (Alianza Popular, San Luis Potosí; Bellavista, Jalisco; and 
Pedernales, Michoacán).  While this strategy promotes productive efficiency, it disregards the 
social and economic impact on sugar-producing communities. 
NAFTA 
NAFTA integrates Mexico into the North American market in consequential ways.  Pre-NAFTA 
studies offered varying predictions concerning NAFTA's impact on employment, yet many 
projected substantial job increases.  The creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs 
benefited the automotive, electronics, and maquiladora industries.  Since enactment of NAFTA, 
however, the economic crisis and competition with foreign firms and goods caused 28,000 
businesses and two million Mexican jobs to disappear (Hansen-Kuhn 1997).  Imported 
commodities that flooded the Mexican market in the 1990s undermined many rural producers.  
With respect to the sugar sector, Mexico's integration into NAFTA threatens the livelihoods of 
unprecedented numbers of cañeros and workers. 
   Important considerations distinguish sugar production in the U.S. and Mexico.     Subsidies to 
U.S. sugar growers and a restrictive tariff-rate quota on sugar imports maintain an artificially 
high price for U.S. sugar.  The beneficiaries of U.S. sugar policy accrue to one percent of 
American farmers as a form of corporate welfare.  In contrast to the U.S., where 851,000 
hectares of land were in cane and sugarbeet production, Mexico had 582,746 hectares of cane 
under cultivation in 1997.  The U.S. concentrates its sugar industry in 12 sugar refineries, while 
the Mexican industry extends across 60 production zones.  U.S. cane and sugarbeet growers 
hold, on average, 100-150 hectares in Louisiana and Texas, and 11,000 hectares in Hawaii and 
Florida.  Mexican cane growers average 3.5 hectares on ejido (agrarian reform) lands, and 12 
hectares on private landholdings (Buzzanell and Lord 1993).  In Mexico, 145,145 cañeros and 
264,411 workers directly depend on the sugar industry; the sector indirectly supports 2,424,969 
individuals (CNIAA, Cámara Nacional de las Industrias Azucarera y Alcoholera).  Thus, market 
integration affects fewer, wealthy industrialists in the U.S., while thousands of Mexicans 
representing a range of social classes depend on the sugar industry for their survival.   
   Competition between the two countries sharpened with enactment of NAFTA.    NAFTA 
prescribes a 15-year phase-out of tariffs.  During the first six years, NAFTA allowed Mexico to 
export 25,000 tons of sugar to the U.S. (.0055% of its national production); in year seven, it could 
export up to 250,000 tons.  If, after six years, Mexico acquired surplus producer status for two 
consecutive years, it could then export all of its surplus, duty-free, to the U.S.  NAFTA defines 
exportable sugar as the surplus that exceeds domestic sugar consumption.  The potential to 
export sugar to the U.S. represented a major benefit for Mexico under the NAFTA agreement.  
Nonetheless, the U.S. allowed Mexico to export only 25,000 tons until 2000-2001, increasing 
allowable exports to 116,000 tons in 2000-2001 and 137,788 tons for 2001-2002.   
   A closer look at trade between the two countries reveals an unbalanced playing field.  In 
addition to disparities in the two economies, political interests circumvented the free trade 
principles stipulated by the original NAFTA document.  U.S. cane and sugarbeet growers 
formed a powerful lobby to oppose NAFTA.  They feared that Mexico would switch to HFCS in 
its soft drink industry, thus generating a larger sugar surplus for export.  An increase in Mexican 
exports threatened to depress U.S. sugar prices.  Under this pressure, last minute modifications 
to NAFTA provided U.S. sugar producers a decided advantage.  NAFTA redefined Mexico's 
exportable sugar as the excess above domestic consumption of cane sugar and high fructose 
corn syrup (Butler and Otero 1995). 
 High fructose corn syrup generated a war of sweeteners within the context of NAFTA.  As the 
U.S. fructose industry expanded at the expense of sugar in the 1970s and 1980s, the government 
protected U.S. growers by imposing quotas on sugar imports (Buzzanell and Lord 1993).  Sugar 
imports retracted from five million to one or two million tons. 
 Mexico, however, regained its sugar export capacity and in 1997 production reached a 
historical benchmark of 5,174,028 tons.  Just when Mexico placed more of its surplus sugar on 
the world market, world overproduction brought international sugar prices down.  Therefore, 
SECOFI (Mexico's Secretary of Commerce) requested an increase in Mexico's quota to the U.S., 
since U.S. sugar prices exceeded those on the world market.  Officials in Mexico's sugar industry 
complained that the persistence of U.S. quotas prevented Mexico from taking advantage of 
market integration under NAFTA. 
   U.S. companies that promoted HFCS as a sugar substitute in Mexico also undercut demand for 
cane sugar on Mexico's domestic market.  In 1992, the U.S. exported 20,000 tons of HFCS to 
Mexico (Kessel, Buzzanell, and Lord 1993); this amount increased to 350,000 tons in 1997 
(Muñoz 1997).  The United States exported 1.3 million tons of high fructose corn syrup to Mexico 
from 1994, when NAFTA came into effect, until the year 2000 (Ortiz 2000), leaving sugar mill 
warehouses stocked with surplus sugar.  In 2000-2001, the U.S. exported 400,000 tons of HFCS 
to Mexico, in addition to U.S.-based plants that produced 300,000 tons of fructose within Mexico.   
The lower price of fructose relative to cane sugar and a NAFTA phase-out of tariffs on HFCS, will 
further increase the flow of HFCS to Mexico.  The USDA projects that by the year 2008, fructose 
is expected to capture 90 percent of the soft drink market and 37 percent of the total sweetener 
market (Cruz 1997; Kessel et al. 1993; Rudiño 1998). 
 The connection between soft drink production and HFCS in Mexico is significant in this context.  
Industrial sugar consumption, a mere 762,386 tons in 1970, reached 2,534,929 tons by 1995.  In 
1991, soft drinks alone accounted for 55 percent of industrial sugar consumption in Mexico 
(Buzzanell and Lord 1993, García Chávez 1997).  However, domestic sugar consumption 
contracted in response to its displacement by HFCS, especially in its use for Mexican soft drinks. 
   In 1997, a bitter conflict emerged when Mexico initiated an antidumping investigation and 
raised tariffs on fructose imports.  Sugar industrialists and soft drink companies reached an 
accord to limit use of HFCS to 380,000 tons over a three-year period.  This agreement 
committed the bottling industry to meet any increase in demand with sugar, rather than HFCS 
(Flores 1997; Rudiño 1997).  The U.S. Senate Agricultural Committee accused the Mexican 
government of illegal actions for limiting the purchase of HFCS.  The U.S. brought the matter 
before the World Trade Organization for violation of the principles of NAFTA.  The committee 
denounced this action, stating, "The establishment of limits sanctioned by the government 
would promote protectionism that NAFTA has sought to eliminate" (González 1997:27).  A 
World Trade Organization decision in February 2000 determined that Mexico must repay, with 
interest, provisional tariffs charged to U.S. corporations for fructose imports (U.S. Trade 
Representative 2001). 
   Since NAFTA gives Mexico the right to export all of its surplus sugar once it achieves surplus 
producer status for two consecutive years, Mexicans argue that they have the right to export 
600,000 tons of sugar to the U.S.  The Kantor-Serra Puche parallel letters (1993) are at the heart of 
the current trade controversy.  U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick argues that this side 
agreement limits imports of Mexican sugar to 250,000 tons until the year 2007.  Mexico’s secretary 
of commerce Ernesto Derbez disclaims the parallel letters with the argument that they were never 
ratified by the Mexican congress and asserts his unwillingness to comply with resolutions of the 
WTO dispute settlement body.  President Fox stated his resolve to defend the industry’s right to 
export all its sugar surplus and retain tariffs on fructose imports.  President Bush insists that the 
U.S. retain full rights to duty-free fructose exports, while maintaining its own protective barriers for 
the U.S. fructose and sugar industries.   
   An interview with a representative of the national cane growers' union captured this critique of 
the unequal trade relationship: 
 The U.S. imports 4,200,000 tons of sugar, but purchases only 25,000 tons from Mexico.  
According to the agreement we made with the industrialists, no more than 380,000 tons of 
HFCS can be sold in Mexico.  Whereas sugar is the survival of the cane grower, fructose is 
death for us.  We intend to confront NAFTA.  We are not going to allow one sugar mill to 
close.  We cannot let the people die; it is necessary to defend them.  This is the only industry 
that employs so many people in the rural sector.  We are trying to protect the work of 
2,000,000 cane growers.  If we leave so many people without employment, where are they 
going to work?  When a sugar mill closes everything ends.  When a sugar mill goes under, 
the community goes under.  This is the oldest industry, with a history of 400 years.  Never in 
the history of this country has it been as threatened as now. 
   Unbalanced trade in sweeteners, mill debts, and social unrest comprise factors that led 
President Fox—former Coca Cola executive and neoliberal champion—to nationalize half of 
Mexico’s sugar mills.  The sugar industry is Mexico’s second largest employer and growers are 
organized into powerful unions that make populist claims on the government.  President Fox 
imposed a 20 percent tax on soft drinks with corn syrup content on January 1, 2002.  Yet, he 
must also convince his North American counterparts to increase Mexico’s sugar quota.  Thus, 
he later announced plans to lift the tax, as he continued to negotiate an increase in sugar 
exports.  Mexico continues—against WTO resolution—to impose tariffs on HFCS imports from 
companies such as ADM, CPI, and Staley).  The controversy continues unabated, for “American 
industry officials are questioning Mexico’s dedication to free markets and are contemplating new 
legal challenges” (Gori 2002).  It is within this context that small-scale producers and workers 
must confront neoliberalism and its impact on their communities. 
LOCAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
Studies that document the impact of neoliberalism indicate a growing consensus that these 
transformations place local societies at increasing risk and often foster social injustices (Carton de 
Grammont 1995; Gates 1993; Phillips 1998).  While neoliberalism may resolve problems of 
international capital accumulation, as an economic model, it often fails to address increasing 
poverty, social disparities, and political unrest that may accompany such transformations (Carton 
de Grammont 1995). 
 Policies that marginalize small-scale producers pose an important challenge for social science 
analysis.  Gates (1993) documents cases of economic triage, a practice that denies credit to less 
efficient producers and downsizes the work force in the name of efficiency.  As Phillips (1998:194) 
points out, "Critical social science requires an engagement that...actively listens to representations 
of the world that vary from those being offered by...neoliberalism" (1998:196).  Below, I introduce 
these alternative representations. 
 Barkin advises researchers to consider two significant forces in dynamic interaction--
neoliberalism and resistance to it (Barkin, Ortiz, and Rosen 1997).  Hernández and Nigh (1995) 
assert that ideologies associated with globalization tend to underrate the power of local cultures.  
Therefore, analysis proceeds by situating the community of Puruarán within the interaction of 
global and local forces.  This analysis privileges both the impact of neoliberalism on the 
community and the multiple ways that local people contested its repercussions.  In analyzing both 
local discourse and acts of confrontation, I illustrate how the closure of the Puruarán mill fostered 
the reassertion of community identity and a social movement in defense of social justice. 
Puruarán and the Community Sugar Mill 
Puruarán's historical dependence on sugar production commenced with the founding of its 
hacienda in 1772.  Agrarian reform in 1938 severed the unity of factory and field formerly 
maintained by the hacienda.  The mill eventually came into the hands of an American, Thomas D. 
Boyd.  When the mill went bankrupt in 1966, the National Ejidal Credit Bank took it over. 
 A plaque on the mill wall, dated January 31, 1966, documents this historic event when 
President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) refinanced the refinery through the Ejido Bank and 
improved it "in benefit of the ejidatarios [agrarian reform recipients] and inhabitants of the region."  
Based on this event, residents claim that the mill rightfully belongs to the community.  This 
understanding shapes local cultural identity and reinforces the importance of the community's 
300-year tradition of sugar production. 
   During the 1970s, the government assumed ownership of decapitalized sugar mills to preserve 
economic stability of the sector.  It took over the Puruarán mill in 1971.  But by the 1980s, 
neoliberal policies called for privatization.  Santos de Hoyos purchased Ingenio Puruarán in 1991.  
Local residents, however, believed the mill to be property of the community and contested the 
legitimacy of its sale to Santos de Hoyos. 
 The Puruarán and Pedernales mills were the least productive of the four refineries in the sale 
package.  Santos, claiming it was unprofitable, closed the Puruarán mill on May 25, 1992.  The 
rationale for closing "inefficient" sugar mills can be measured against data that reveal the place of 
Ingenio Puruarán among other mills in the country.  In 1991, Puruarán had 2,062 hectares of cane 
in cultivation, industrialized 158,498 tons of cane, and produced 15,400 tons of sugar.  Puruarán 
represented the fifth smallest refinery in the country in volume of production.  Nonetheless, in 
1992, the year the mill closed, the field yield (tons of cane per hectare) at Puruarán averaged 
91.63, in contrast to the national average of 74.34.  Only 14 of Mexico's 62 mills surpassed 
Puruarán's yields, and 48 had lower averages.  While the factory yield (tons of sugar produced per 
ton of cane) at Puruarán reached 9.70, the national average registered 9.28.  Eighteen mills 
surpassed Puruarán and 44 achieved lower factory yields.  Also, in 1992, extraction of sucrose 
during the processing of cane at Puruarán reached 13.01 percent, while the national average 
registered 12.36 percent.  Puruarán ranked twelfth in the nation (CNIAA 1995).  Santos' other 
mills surpassed Puruarán in volume, yet Puruarán ranked relatively high in measures of efficiency. 
 Overemployment contributed to inefficiency of sugar mills and taxed their profitability.  
Representatives from the national mill workers' union warned workers at Puruarán in 1991 that 
without a major worker layoff, the mill would be closed.  An ex-worker recalled, "We did not want 
to leave--we said 'all' or 'none.'  Well, we were ignorant, right?  Because we did not know what 
agreements they had made.  We said, 'If you are going to hang some, hang everyone.'"  Workers 
at Santos' Pedernales mill, 11 kilometers away, agreed to accept some worker layoffs, which most 
likely played an important role in the rationale for keeping it open.  Puruarán, on the other hand, is 
a substantially larger community with an infrastructure that supports a larger number of people.  In 
terms of employment, the decision to close the Puruarán factory held greater impact. 
 The realization that HFCS reduced demand for cane sugar constituted another factor that 
influenced the owner's decision to close the Puruarán mill.  Low world market prices for sugar 
exports and emerging competition with HFCS within Mexico made the decision to concentrate 
investments in fewer mills a logical strategy. 
 Whereas neoliberal incentives played a major role in the decision to close the Puruarán mill, 
Santos' strategy overlooked the impact borne by local residents.  This refinery served as the 
economic hub for Puruarán and surrounding communities.  Ingenio Puruarán supported 2,260 
cane growers, 800 cane cutters, 244 truck and tractor drivers, and 530 mill workers.  The 
economic activity directly and indirectly benefited 36,050 inhabitants of the region.  Its demise 
stifled economic activity throughout the region. 
The Social Impact of Mill Closure on Puruarán 
The impact of neoliberal policy often goes unnoted.  The abrupt termination of economic activity in 
1992, however, imposed a severe crisis regarding peoples' ability to sustain family and community 
forms of survival.  Unemployment, increased poverty, out-migration, and violence born of social 
stress played havoc in a community formerly knit by cultural traditions extending back to the 
colonial period. 
 Economically, loss of income affected access to housing, food, clothing, education, and medical 
care.  Socially, Puruarán's residents experienced profound distress, mixed with rage over their 
exclusion from the benefits of modernization.  Many turned to robbing, alcoholism, 
narcotrafficking, and violence where no other solution materialized.  Below, I draw on local 
discourse to give voice to their outrage. 
 Concern with preservation of their families, their community, and the right to work punctuate 
conversations that fill the everyday lives of people in Puruarán.  The parish priest, perceptively 
attuned to the needs of the community, confided: 
 I arrived when it was very critical, after they closed the mill.  You can still see the great 
poverty because many jobs were lost.  The pay from the mill that was received in all the region, 
all this brought people for commerce--the commerce was lively.  [But now] the stores are barely 
surviving.  Many [of them] closed and many ex-workers had to leave Puruarán--they had to 
migrate.  This was a consequence of the closing. 
 The first six months after I arrived, pickups with high-powered weapons passed, firing at all 
hours.  The people, at six in the afternoon, no longer left their houses.  I believe that for lack of 
employment and with the crisis here, it provoked peoples' nerves.  Many young boys have been 
killed by police while robbing in the streets.  How many have been killed?  Well, we lost count.  
Here we say that when 15 days pass without an assassination, it is a long time.  And the 
violence continues. 
 This reality contrasts sharply with the historical legacy of cane and sugar production that gave 
form to community life.  An 82 year-old cane grower elaborated on this cultural tradition.  His 
father had worked at the Puruarán mill and labored in the cane fields to provide for the family.  His 
father taught him to cultivate cane when he was a boy.  In 1938, when President Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940) distributed land to campesinos (rural workers), he received his ejido parcel 
of two hectares.  All of his own seven children became cane growers.  Like most families in 
Puruarán, the tradition of working in the cane or the mill spanned many generations. 
 This cañero assessed the mill closure:  "We don't have any other industry...  As long as I 
remember this has been the only industry here.  Now we have no money--from where?"  He 
received his highest profits, $2567 (U.S.), at Ingenio Puruarán.  After the mill closed in 1992, he 
delivered his cane to Ingenio Pedernales.  From 1993 to 1994, he received no profits and in 1995 
earned only $135 (U.S.).  In his words, "The cane growers are sweating so that others can benefit.  
The mill owners are enjoying their life and the poor cane grower is suffering." 
 Many sugarcane growers opted to deliver their cane to the Pedernales mill after the closure.  Of 
the 1140 cañeros who delivered cane to the Puruarán mill in 1991, 74 percent of these delivered 
cane to Santos' Pedernales mill in 1998.  The Pedernales mill could not process all the cane in the 
two zones, cañeros paid higher transportation costs, and contracting with Ingenio Pedernales 
often resulted in debts.  Thus, many of these growers decided to quit sugarcane production. 
 One of the cañeros, who received a profit of $1605 (U.S.) at the Puruarán mill before it closed, 
lost his earnings once he contracted with Pedernales in 1994.  In 1995, mill supervisors left his 
cane in the field, unharvested.  Nonetheless, he still owed $1500 (U.S.) for production costs.  The 
manager of the Pedernales mill denied him credit the following year and he quit cane production.  
No longer a contracted cane grower, he lost access to health insurance and retirement benefits.  
Subsequently, mill supervisors attempted to rent his land.  Rather than rent to the mill, he rented 
out his land for pasture, providing him an income of $135 (U.S.) per year. 
 Unlike cañeros, all mill workers faced unemployment.  One of the mill workers, with 24 years 
experience in the mill, received $4000 (U.S.) in severance pay.  He related how the loss of 
employment affected him: 
   The money ran out after two months.  Now I work in the campo like an animal and barely earn 
$3 (U.S.) a day.  This is how our government has us.  Here is the part I don't understand.  We 
are cut off, working like monkeys cutting cane, and the clothing and everything is running out. 
 Another ex-mill worker lamented the hardships he endured once the mill closed: 
 My father worked in the mill.  Here his life ended, here in Puruarán.  There were four children; 
we were all boys.  Two of my brothers worked in the mill.  Well, my father earned very little, but 
he earned enough to pay the bills and to have money to spend. 
 I earned a little [in the mill], to buy something for my wife, or to buy shoes--I had a family too.  
I was earning $42-45 (U.S.) a week when they closed the mill. And no, they did not pay us [a 
severance pay] according to the law--they only gave me $1700 (U.S.).  It was gone after three 
months.  Everything has killed me and all this money is spent.  With all the obligations I have, 
what am I to do?  And then with no work in the campo? 
   Rural workers who were neither cañeros nor mill-workers also experienced the effects of the 
mill closure.  One of these workers related: 
 I have been a campesino all my life.  I cut cane and whatever work there was to do.  My 
sons also depended on this source of work.  Now, I have no work.  I have looked, but there 
isn't any.  The people here in Puruarán need this source of work so they can survive.  If our 
government doesn't reopen our source of work, how are we going to live?  We have to rob or 
we have to plant other things, like marijuana.  That is what our government is pushing us to 
do.  We are not to blame, if suddenly we have to rob because we are hungry.  They closed 
this mill only for the caprice of a single person.  Imagine, for the caprice of a single person, 
how many people are suffering here! 
 Even those with no direct relationship to the mill suffered consequences.  Cane growers and 
mill workers patronized local businesses and contributed to cash flow in the community.  Owners 
of small businesses, teachers, doctors, and others confirmed that many residents lost, on 
average, 30 percent of their incomes and some faced bankruptcy. 
   A restaurant owner earned approximately $40 (U.S.) per day before the mill closed; 
subsequently, his earnings dropped to $13-$17 (U.S.).  He reflected: 
 The sugar mill has always been the source of work here.  Before, on Fridays--payday--the 
restaurant was filled, and now it is empty.  In that time, on Sundays, the people formed a line all 
the way down the stairway, waiting for a table.  Now there is no way to maintain myself.  Well, it 
is very hard to keep going. 
 The owner of a clothing store, the only source of income for her family of seven, complained, 
"Yes, you can see that [the mill closing] affected us because the sales are not the same.  Before, 
in one day I would sell 12 dresses, and now, one dress."  She related that previously most people 
bought merchandise with cash, but since the mill closed, they rely on credit:  "...they buy on pure 
credit.  Also, I am risking because many don't pay me back."  Before the mill closed, she sold 
about $670 (U.S.) in clothing per week (before discounting her costs).  In 1997, she averaged 
$400 (U.S.)--a drop of 40 percent in her business. 
 These two businesses are representative of the numerous commercial enterprises in Puruarán.  
All revealed a common pattern of economic decline.  The mill closing also affected education in 
Puruarán.  Unable to pay for school uniforms, lunches, and supplies, many parents withdrew their 
children from school.  Enrollment at the primary and secondary level dropped by 30 percent from 
1992 to 1997.  Professionals, whose parents often paid for their educations with income derived 
from the sugar mill, also felt the impact.  A dentist in Puruarán obtained his professional education 
with the earnings of his father, a sugarcane grower.  The dentist served 15-20 patients per day 
before the mill closed; that number fell to 5-7 per day after 1992.  Both dental and medical care 
have suffered, as only cane growers who contract with the Pedernales mill are covered by health 
insurance.  Health insurance and pension funds for all mill workers terminated when the mill 
closed. 
   The mill closing imposed obvious economic repercussions on the community, but also brought 
psychological stress which translated into alcoholism and violence.  These destructive forces tore 
some families apart.  The extraordinary number of homes with the words "se vende" (for sale) on 
their exteriors provides testimony of this hardship.  Emigration to the United States is not new, yet 
the mill closure forced many more to leave Puruarán.  Those who left send remittances to family 
members in Puruarán.  Here, remittances are used for survival purposes, rather than for home 
improvements or acquisition of consumer goods.  Census data verify the scope of out-migration.  
The population declined 16.6 percent, from 13,638 to 11,373 between 1987 and 1996. 
 These consequences generated diverse responses.  Alternative strategies to cope with 
marginalization and ensure livelihoods ranged from efforts to find alternative sources of 
employment, to thievery and drug trafficking, to out-migration.  Most of the community's residents, 
however, joined in a social movement to reopen the Puruarán sugar mill. 
Emergence of the Social Movement 
The social movement that emerged following the mill closure drew on the community's tradition of 
"cultura cañera" (cane culture).  The movement fortified community solidarity by calling on shared 
cultural understandings of Puruarán's historical dependence on cane and sugar production.  The 
forging of the social movement reinforced notions of local community identity and bound people 
together in common purpose.  On December 7, 1992, community residents mobilized across 
class and occupational lines and illegally seized the abandoned sugar refinery.  Under the 
leadership of Gregorio Alvarez Vargas, cane growers, mill workers, and townspeople surrounded 
the mill and removed six guards placed there by the owner. 
 After the seizure, 180 workers volunteered their labor to repair the factory and put it back in 
operation.  The illegal harvest, known locally as the "miniharvest," lasted from March through May, 
1993.  Workers operated the sugar mill without the aid of engineers, chemists, and other 
technicians.  They processed 36,000 tons cane (almost one-fourth of the cane in the zone) into 
3,300 tons of sugar, valued at $93,333 (U.S.) and made partial payments to some 500-700 cane 
growers.  Nonetheless, the mill owner prohibited them from selling the sugar that remained in the 
warehouse. 
 A boiler mechanic explained his involvement in the illegal mill seizure.  His discourse illustrates 
how strong community ties, local work ethic, and ideas about social justice shaped local 
understandings that led him to join the social movement: 
 I did not think just in myself.  I was thinking about my community, that the government was 
going to leave it a pure ghost town, without employment, without this source of work. Because if 
you had seen how in the mill all the people were active, the extensive activity, and it made a lot 
of money flow.  Then it ended and look how we are.  Never was it like this when we had the 
mill.  Our goal is to open the Puruarán mill.  We are struggling only so we can work, that is all.  
We are working people and we demonstrated that with the miniharvest that we made, without 
even one engineer, with no one else but the workers.  And we produced sugar and we are not 
afraid to present it before any sugar mill that has all its engineers, all its technicians. 
 This action, however, brought Puruarán residents into direct conflict with the mill owner and the 
government.  Santos called on the state governor, who then ordered police to arrest the leaders of 
the social movement.  Police removed seven people from their homes at gunpoint, and 
incarcerated them.  Released on bail after 20 days, they were put on parole for four years.  One of 
the parolees, suffering diabetes and heart disease, died before his release from parole 
obligations.  He had migrated with his family to Veracruz after the mill closed, but returned to 
Puruarán to engage in the struggle to reopen the sugar mill.  Another of the detainees related, 
"We did not rob, we did not kill, we did not take anyone's property away from them.  The crime 
was to work.  That was the crime.  The crime was to work, that is why they jailed us." 
 The day of the arrests, July 3, 1993, armed police besieged the town.  One hundred fifty to 200 
police entered Puruarán at 5:00 a.m. and began to dismantle the sugar mill.  As the church bells 
tolled, townspeople united in a demonstration that prohibited the police from removing additional 
mill equipment.  Subsequently, sixty preventative police arrived to guard the mill, from 1993 to 
1996.  While under their "protection," police guards dismantled and destroyed machinery, cut 
cables, broke windows, and fired numerous rifle shots through the roof.  They intended to destroy 
the mill to prevent the community from operating the factory. 
 The leader of the social movement, Gregorio Alvarez, escaped after absconding with much of 
the profit from the illegal miniharvest.  His deceit contributed to a series of divisions within the 
social movement and left residents disillusioned and mistrustful.  As community tensions 
increased, a struggle for control of the social movement began.  Violence in the community 
escalated.  In 1995, the comisariado ejidal (president of the ejido) became the victim of murder.  
The 1996 murder of Gregorio Alvarez followed.  In this context of escalating violence, conflicts 
over the sugar mill resulted in the murder of 15 individuals within a three-year period.  The 
community lost its former unity as new groups emerged to take control of the social movement to 
reopen the sugar mill. 
 Puruarán's priest assumed leadership of the social movement in 1995, at the insistence of 500-
600 people attending a community meeting.  The Committee for the Struggle to Reopen Ingenio 
Puruarán (hence, "Committee") formed under his leadership.  The Committee began a three-year 
legal campaign to oblige the government to intervene on behalf of the community.  Members of 
the Committee presented petitions for expropriation of the mill to Michoacán's governor, state 
officials, national officials, and President Ernesto Zedillo.  The Committee based its demand for 
expropriation on alleged violations of the sale contract, which obligates purchasers to maintain the 
factories as sources of employment and to improve their productive capacities.  Furthermore, it 
requires them to "foment modernization, rehabilitation, diversification, integration, and agricultural 
development."  The Committee argued that the owner's noncompliance with the sale contract 
justified expropriation. 
 In 1995 the Committee met with Santos de Hoyos and proposed three alternatives:  1) that he 
sell or rent the mill to the community; 2) that he remain owner and let the community operate the 
mill; or 3) that he reopen the mill and operate it himself.  Santos' response illustrates the 
exclusionary character of the current development trend and its inability to address social 
injustices:  "The social aspect, the development [of the region], to remove so many people of the 
region from poverty, this is not my responsibility.  As a businessman, it has to be a business that 
gives me earnings."  Santos planned to salvage equipment from the Puruarán mill to use in his 
Pedernales refinery.  Ultimately, he demanded that the community vacate and return the mill to 
him and threatened to close the nearby Pedernales mill, as well, if it were not returned.  After 
failing to achieve a favorable response, in 1996 townspeople again seized the Puruarán mill and 
forced Santos' police guards to leave. 
 In the meantime, the Committee began to work with the Michoacán government to establish 
small factories as alternative sources of employment.  None materialized.  Nonetheless, these 
projects turned many people against the official Committee.  The movement fractured with 
accusations that the priest's Committee "sold out" to the government and was no longer interested 
in reopening the sugar mill.  Charges flourished that its leaders became involved in the movement 
only for political purposes.  When the president of the Committee ran for Presidente Municipal on 
the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) ticket in 1998, many claimed he supported the mill 
opening in order to win votes. 
 A new faction emerged under the leadership of Pedro Tapia (pseudonym), a former mill 
accountant.  On December 11, 1998, Tapia formed the Sociedad Cooperativa Trabajadores del 
Ingenio Puruarán (hence, "Sociedad Cooperativa"), comprised of loyal PRDistas (members of the 
Partido Revolucionario Democrática).  Some of them, as well, aspired to local offices in the 1998 
elections.  Political opening in Mexico and politization of the struggle along party lines further 
disunited the social movement.  Tapia's faction forced the Committee's guards out of the mill on 
April 20, 1998, and initiated a second illegal operation of the mill, with poor results.  Because of 
mechanical failures, they processed only 20 tons of sugar from 5,000 tons of cane delivered by 
loyal cañeros. 
 Curiously, the mill owner and state authorities did not intervene in the 1998 operation.  
Indirectly, however, the manager of the Pedernales mill denied further credit to cañeros who 
delivered cane to Puruarán.  The government, in turn, dismissed workers involved in repair and 
operation of the mill from employment in the construction of irrigation canals.  The irrigation project 
offered the most important, if temporary, source of employment since the mill closure. 
 Cañeros who delivered cane to Santos' Pedernales mill in 1998 suffered different 
consequences.  In August, with 60 percent of its sugar still in the warehouse, competition with 
HFCS left Ingenio Pedernales without the cash flow to make payments to cane growers.  Lists 
posted on the door of the casa ejidal (ejido building) advised cañeros when they would receive 
payment for their cane.  People lined up daily to check the lists and desperation mounted, since 
over two and one-half months had passed since the end of the harvest. 
 Tapia's faction quickly lost most of its support after the leader sold the sugar and syrup stored 
since the 1993 miniharvest, then claimed that he had no money to pay cañeros or mill workers.  
This created greater discontent among those who labored for months growing cane, repairing the 
mill, and processing the cane without pay.  Accusations spread through the community that Tapia 
pocketed money from the sale of sugar, that the priest's group confiscated cash donations made 
to the social movement, and that the Committee had been bought off by the government.  Even 
so, the desire to reopen the mill rivaled the force of increasing factionalism.  One resident's 
commentary illustrated this greater common aim: 
   Well, there were certain things about the priest's committee that we did not like, but we are 
in the same boat.  Thus, if they get it opened, well fine.  And if Tapia achieves it, good, or 
another group, good.  Here, if the virgin opens it, if the Señor San José [the village patron 
saint] opens it, but [what matters is] that it gets opened. 
    Political will to reopen the mill transcended the sharp divisions in 1998 as events unfolded 
that promised to reenergize the local economy.  In August, Tapia's faction visited officials of 
Pascual, a manufacturer of the natural fruit drinks marketed under the "Boing" label.  Pascual 
works with cooperatives, finances their operations, and purchases their sugar for its products.  
On January 28, 1999, the Puruarán mill once again opened its doors under contract with 
Pascual.  During the 1999 harvest, between 200 and 300 cane growers, including those 
associated with the official Committee, delivered their cane to Puruarán.  Mill workers, who 
processed 3,000 tons of sugar, again received their bi-monthly paychecks.  By 2000, from 
60,470 tons of cane, the Puruarán mill produced 5,134 tons of sugar, valued at $2,247,000 
(U.S.).  Production directly benefited 1250 cañeros and 237 mill workers.  This solution provides 
people with work and income and guarantees a market for their sugar.  People in this community, 
acutely aware of global trends that threaten their livelihoods, sought an alternative solution.  As 
one mill worker asserted, "Pascual does not use one drop of fructose."   
CONCLUSIONS 
In the Mexican sugar sector, privatization initially showed poor performance as a result of deficient 
investments, excessive sugar imports, and rising debts among cañeros.  A strategy of triage--the 
exclusion of inefficient cane growers and unproductive sugar mills accompanied economic 
recovery of the industry in the mid 1990s.  Gains made in the sector were not equitably 
distributed.  While some cañeros benefited, others found themselves marginalized. 
 Recovery of Mexico's sugar export capacity coincided with implementation of NAFTA.  Even 
though neoliberalism promotes laissez-faire principles, political pressure to protect the U.S. 
sugar market circumvented dictums for "free trade."  Whereas quotas limited Mexico's access to 
the U.S. market, HFCS presented fierce competition in its domestic market.  The import of 
HFCS from the U.S. threatened to close 20 of Mexico's remaining 60 sugar mills.  From the 
perspective of the government, over-production on the world market and displacement of cane 
sugar with alternative sweeteners makes consolidation of into fewer mills a logical choice.  The 
recent expropriation of mills, while contradictory to neoliberalism, may represent an initial move 
in this direction.  A number of expropriated mills will likely meet the same fate as Ingenio 
Puruarán.   
   In the context of global transformation, this chapter examined one community's response to 
the closure of its sugar mill.  This closure may be viewed as an outcome of the macro-level 
forces cited above.  Residents of Puruarán, Michoacán united to reject the neoliberal model that 
threatened community integrity and their means of family survival.  Puruarán may not be 
representative of other communities that struggle with neoliberalism.  Yet this community 
demonstrates how, through local resistance, its residents managed to restore social justice. 
   A large volume of theoretical literature addresses macro-level perspectives of neoliberalism 
(Gustafson 1994).  Transformations taking place in rural communities may be less visible, but 
equally dramatic.  This chapter takes into account "the impact of neoliberal policies on the 
people we do not usually hear from" (Phillips 1998:xi) without neglecting the dynamic interaction 
of global and local perspectives and processes.  It accounts for global transformations in 
neoliberal ideology and practice, yet gives voice to those who mobilized to confront its 
consequences.  
   Literature on alternatives to the neoliberal model suggests much room for theoretical debate 
on the ability of neoliberalism to hold sway against local will.  Yet, despite the probability that 
Latin American governments will continue to extend neoliberal policies, there is evidence for 
growing popular resistance among those subjected to marginalization (Petras 1999; Phillips 
1998; Stephen 1997).  As Fox (1994) clarifies, when the state withdraws social guarantees, 
militant opposition increases, along with the capacity of campesino movements to seek 
alternative means of survival.  The social movement that emerged in Puruarán exemplifies 
growing discontent and willingness to find alternative solutions.  The cooperative continues to 
operate the mill, but is plagued by ongoing internal struggles and bossism, and production costs 
that exceed income.   
   Resistance to neoliberalism expresses itself in diverse ways, from accommodation, to more 
high-risk, independent collective action (Chollett 1997; Petras 1999; Phillips 1998).  The factors 
that condition alternative strategies remain obscure, but preliminary analysis of Puruarán's 
social movement suggests several factors that led to political mobilization:  historically deep 
cultural traditions, abrupt closure of the community's main source of employment, lack of 
economic alternatives, inability of most residents to sustain their families, and a capacity to 
forge unified action based on identification with the community. 
   Several research questions remain for future analysis.  Will campesinos benefit from 
neoliberalism in the long-term?  Will they compensate for the retrenchment of market-driven 
forces by abandoning small-scale production for wage labor?  Can emigration resolve 
unemployment caused by corporate consolidation?  As traditional crops lose their competitive 
value, will more lucrative illegal crops become the strategy of preference?  Or, alternatively, will 
future macro-level economic policies be flexible enough to incorporate concern with cultural 
integrity, community social institutions, economic self-sufficiency, and demands for autonomous 
political action that emanate from local communities? 
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iFor example, Empresas Gamesa, whose owner purchased the Puruarán mill, is a consortium 
comprised of numerous enterprises:  Promotora Agropecuaria Gamesa, Productos Gerber, 
Ingenios Gamesa, and Grupo Gamesa.  Grupo Gamesa includes Nabisco Famosa, Harinera 
Santos, Dulces Lady Baltimore, Mareas Alimenticias Internacionales, Galletera Palma, Gamesa 
Comercial, Desarrollo Industrial Gamesa, Almacenadora Gamesa, Desarrollo Inmobiliario 
Gamesa, Pastas Tepeyac, Inmobiliario Jalisciense, Corporativo Gamesa, and Acrosantos (Ortega 
1990). 
iiMexico imported sugar from:  Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Korea, Philippines (Diario de Colima 1991; 
Zúñiga 1992). 
iiiThese increases included:  hectares of cane, 14 percent; tons of cane, 21 percent; field yield 
(tons of cane per hectare), 6 percent; tons of sugar, 43% percent; kg. of sugar per hectare, 25% 
percent; sucrose content of cane, 16% percent; and factory yield, 18 percent (source:  CNIAA). 
 
 
 
